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I. COVENANT MARRIAGE V. CONTRACT MARRIAGE1
On August 15, 1997, the State of Louisiana put in place the nation’s
first modern covenant marriage law. The law creates a two-tiered system of
marriage. Couples may choose a contract marriage, with minimal formali-
ties of formation and attendant rights to no-fault divorce. Or couples may
choose a covenant marriage, with more stringent formation and dissolution
rules. The licensing costs for either form of marriage are the same. In order
to form a covenant marriage, however, the parties must receive detailed
counseling about marriage from a professional marriage counselor or a re-
ligious official, and then swear an oath, pledging “full knowledge of the
nature, purposes, and responsibilities of marriage” and promising “to love,
* John Witte, Jr. is Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law and Ethics and Director of the
Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Emory University. Joel A. Nichols is Associate Profes-
sor of Law, University of St. Thomas (Minnesota). An earlier version of this article appeared as a
chapter by the same title in JOHN WITTE, JR., GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE 364–85 (2006). The
article is adapted from John Witte Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Introduction, in COVENANT MARRIAGE IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1–25 (John Witte Jr. & Eliza Ellison eds., 2005).
1. This article is part of a larger project on “Multi-Tiered Marriage,” which draws upon
ideas from Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New York and
Louisiana to the International Community, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 135 (Jan. 2007). The
project on Multi-Tiered Marriage has received generous funding from Emory University’s Center
for the Study of Law and Religion, Pepperdine University and Pepperdine University School of
Law, and the University of St. Thomas School of Law. See Joel A. Nichols, Foreword: Marriage,
Religion, and the Role of the Civil State, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 544 (2008).
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honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of our
lives.”2 Divorce is allowed such covenanted couples only on grounds of
serious fault (adultery, capital felony, malicious desertion, and/or physical
or sexual abuse of the spouse or one of the children) or after two years of
separation.3 Separation from bed and board is allowed on any of these same
fault grounds as well as on proof of habitual intemperance, cruel treatment,
or outrages of the other spouse. Comparable covenant marriage statutes are
now in place in Arizona and Arkansas as well.4 At least twenty-seven other
states either have considered or have under consideration covenant marriage
alternatives to contract marriages.5
These new covenant marriage laws are designed, in part, to help offset
the corrosive effects of America’s experiment with a private contractual
model of marriage. Historically, in America and in much of the West, mar-
riages were presumptively permanent commitments, and marriage forma-
tion and dissolution were serious public events. Marriage formation
required the consent of parents and peers, the procurement of a state certifi-
cate, the publication of banns, and a public ceremony and celebration after a
period of waiting and discernment. Marriage dissolution required public
hearings, proof of serious fault by one party, alimony payments to the inno-
cent dependent spouse, and ongoing support payments for minor children.6
In the last third of the twentieth century, many of these traditional rules
gave way to a private contractual model of marriage grounded in new cul-
tural and constitutional norms of sexual liberty and privacy. In virtually all
states, marriage formation rules were simplified to require only the acquisi-
tion of a license from the state registry followed by solemnization before a
licensed official—without banns, with little or no waiting, with no public
celebration, and without notification of others. Marriage dissolution rules
were simplified through the introduction of unilateral no-fault divorce. New
streamlined and inexpensive marital dissolution procedures aimed to release
miserable couples from the shackles of unwanted marriages and to relieve
swollen court dockets from the prospects of protracted litigation. Either the
husband or the wife could now file a simple suit for divorce. No fault by
either party would need to be proved—or staged. Courts would dissolve the
2. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:273(A)(1) (2008).
3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 103 (2008).
4. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:272 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-901 (2008); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-801 (2007).
5. Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Mich-
igan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin.
6. For a comprehensive survey of these earlier American marriage laws, see CHARLES F.
VERNIER, 1 AMERICAN FAMILY LAW (5th ed. 1931).
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union, often making a one-time division of marital property to give each
party a clean break to start life anew.7
America’s experiment with the private contractual model of marriage
has failed on many counts and accounts—with children and women bearing
the primary costs.8 From 1975–2000, a quarter of all children were raised in
single-parent households.9 One-quarter of all pregnancies were aborted.
One-third of all children were born to single mothers.10 One-half of all mar-
riages ended in divorce. Two-thirds of all African-American children were
raised without a father.11 Mother-only homes had less than a third of the
median income of homes with a regular male present, and four times the
rates of foreclosure and eviction.12 Teenagers who grew up in broken
homes proved two to three times more likely to have behavioral, learning,
and socialization problems than teenagers from two-parent homes.13 More
than two-thirds of juveniles and young adults convicted of major felonies
from 1970 to 1995 came from single- or no-parent homes.14
Covenant marriage laws have been one of several legal responses to
these mounting social and psychological costs of America’s experiment
with easy-in/easy-out marriage. Covenant marriage laws capture the tradi-
tional ideal that marriage is “more than just a piece of paper,” more than
just a transient and terminal private contract for sexual intimacy.15 The
foundation of covenant marriage is a pledge of presumptive permanent sac-
rifice—“to love, care, and honor one another as husband and wife for the
rest of our lives.” The formation of covenant marriage is a public and delib-
erative event—requiring a waiting period, and at least the consent of the
couples’ parents or guardians and the counseling of therapists or clerics,
and by implication the communities whom those third parties represent. The
7. JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN
THE WESTERN TRADITION (1997) [hereinafter FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT] .
8. JUDITH WALLERSTEIN, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AF-
TER DIVORCE (15th ed. 2004); DON S. BROWNING, MARRIAGE AND MODERNIZATION (2003);
LINDA J. WAITE, DOES DIVORCE MAKE PEOPLE HAPPY? FINDINGS FROM A STUDY OF UNHAPPY
MARRIAGES (2002); JUDITH S. WALLERSEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE
(2000); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1996); Katherine Shaw Spaht,
For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1547 (1998).
9. Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward a
More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 931 (1998).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 930.
13. Id.
14. Nichols, supra note 9, at 931. For more recent studies, some with more encouraging
recent statistics, see generally FAMILY TRANSFORMED: RELIGION, VALUES, AND SOCIETY IN AMER-
ICAN LIFE (Steven M. Tipton & John Witte, Jr., eds., 2005); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TO-
GETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999); ALL OUR FAMILIES: NEW POLICIES FOR A
NEW CENTURY (Mary Ann Mason, Arlene Skolnick & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1998).
15. MARRIAGE: JUST A PIECE OF PAPER? (Katherine Anderson, Don Browning & Brian Boyer
eds., 2002).
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dissolution of covenant marriage comes only upon betrayal of the funda-
mental goods of this institution or after a suitable period of separation and
careful deliberation.
Covenant marriage laws reflect the historical lesson that rules gov-
erning marital formation and marital dissolution must be balanced in their
stringency—and that separation must be maintained as a release valve.
Stern rules of marital dissolution require stern rules of marital formation.
Loose formation rules demand loose dissolution rules. Proponents of cove-
nant marriage have insisted that the task of fixing the modern problem of
transient marriages requires reforms at both ends of the marital process.16 A
number of states have recently responded to the problem of transient mar-
riage simply by tightening their rules of no-fault divorce, but without corre-
sponding attention to the rules of marital formation and separation. Such
efforts, standing alone, are misguided. The cause of escalating marital
breakdown is not only no-fault divorce, as is so often said, but also no-faith
marriage.
Covenant marriage laws allow prospective marital couples to contract
out of the state’s laws of marriage contract by choosing a covenant mar-
riage. Couples who consider covenant marriage must fully apprise them-
selves of the costs and benefits of protracting the process of marital
formation and waiving their rights to no-fault divorce. But the choice of
marital form is theirs. Having this choice encourages inaptly matched
couples to discover their incompatibility before marriage, rather than after
it. If one engaged party wants a contract marriage and the other a covenant
marriage, the disparity in prospective commitment should, for many
couples, be too plain to ignore. Couples should delay their wedding until
their mutual commitment has deepened, or cancel their wedding if their
respective commitments remain disparate. Better to prepare well for a mar-
riage than to rush into it. Better to cancel a wedding than to divorce shortly
after it. Such is the theory of the new covenant marriage laws.
These covenant marriage laws seek both to respect the virtues of mar-
riage contracts and the values of enduring marriages. These laws have been
attacked as an undue encroachment on sexual liberty and on the rights of
women and children; as a “Trojan horse” designed to smuggle biblical prin-
ciples back into American law; as an improper delegation of state responsi-
bilities to religious officials; and as a reversion to the days of staged and
spurious charges of marital fault which no-fault laws had sought to over-
come.17 But such constitutional objections seem largely unavailing, given
the religiously-neutral language of these laws; their explicit protections of
16. For a chapter written by one of the principal drafters of the Louisiana covenant marriage
statute, see Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Modern American Covenant Marriage Movement: Its Ori-
gins and Its Future, in COVENANT MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 239 (John Witte, Jr.
& Eliza Ellison eds., 2005) [hereinafter COVENANT MARRIAGE].
17. Id.
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both voluntary entrance and exit from the covenant union; their insistence
that religious counselors be restricted in the marriage counseling they can
offer on behalf of the state; and the overriding commitment of these laws to
the freedom of contract of both parties.18
II. MARRIAGE AS MORE THAN A MERE CONTRACT
Covenant marriage laws are not only a new form of social engineering
designed to counter the rise of privatized marriage and no-fault divorce, but
they are also a new forum for the expression of traditional common law
teachings that marriage is “more than a mere contract.” In the American
common law tradition, marriage has long been regarded as a natural if not a
spiritual estate, a useful if not an essential association, a pillar if not the
foundation of civil society.19 Marriage has required more than the general
rules of private contract—of offer and acceptance, consideration and rescis-
sion, reformation and remedy. It has drawn to itself special rules and rituals
of betrothal and espousal, of registration and consecration, and of consent
and celebration. It has also provided the basis for a long series of special
rights and duties of husband and wife, and parent and child, that are
respected at both public and private law. As the American jurist Joseph
Story (1779–1845) put it in 1834:
Marriage is treated by all civilized societies as a peculiar and fa-
vored contract. It is in its origin a contract of natural law. . . . It is
the parent, and not the child of society; the source of civility and a
sort of seminary of the republic. In civil society it becomes a civil
contract, regulated and prescribed by law, and endowed with civil
consequences. In most civilized countries, acting under a sense of
the force of sacred obligations, it has had the sanctions of religion
superadded. It then becomes a religious, as well as a natural and
civil contract; . . . it is a great mistake to suppose that because it is
the one, therefore it may not be the other.20
These traditional common law teachings that marriage is both a con-
tract and something more was rooted in ancient Christian teachings. These
Christian teachings, in turn, had antecedents and analogues in ancient Jew-
ish and Islamic teachings. Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions alike
have long taught that marriage is a contract—called the ketubah in Judaism,
18. See id.; see also Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, What Does Covenant Mean for
Relationships?, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 265.
19. See JOHN WITTE, JR., GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE 322, 322–63, 364–85 (2006); JOHN
WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT, supra note 7.
20. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN
REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES 100, at § 108 (1834). In his second edition, Story
added this note to the quoted passage:
It appears to me something more than a mere contract. It is rather to be deemed an
institution of society founded upon the consent and contract of the parties; and in this
view it has some peculiarities in its nature, character, operation, and extent of operation,
different from what belongs to ordinary contracts.
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the pactum in Christianity, and the kitab in Islam. But these traditions have
also long taught that marriage is more than a mere contract—more than
simply a private bargain to be formed, maintained, and dissolved as the two
marital parties see fit. For all three traditions, marriage is an institution that
is both private and public, individual and social, and temporal and transcen-
dent in quality. Its origin, nature, and purpose lie beyond and beneath the
terms of the marriage contract itself.21
A. Marriage as Contract
It is important to recognize that, while the three traditions of Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam have long taught that marriage is more than a con-
tract, they have also insisted that marriage is not less than a contract.
Nearly two millennia ago, Jewish Rabbis created the ketubah, the pre-
marital contract in which the husband and the wife spelled out the terms and
conditions of their relationship before, during, and after the marriage, and
the rights and duties of husband, wife, and child in the event of marital
dissolution or death of one of the parties. The Talmudic Rabbis regarded
these marriage contracts as essential protections for wives and children who
were otherwise subject to the unilateral right of divorce granted to men by
the Mosaic law.22 While the terms of the ketubah could be privately con-
tracted, both the couple’s families and the rabbinic authorities were often
actively involved in their formation and enforcement.23
More than a millennium and a half ago, Christian theologians adopted
the marriage pact or bond.24 These contracts forged a new relationship be-
tween husband and wife and their respective families. They adopted and
adapted a number of the marital and familial rights and duties set out in the
household codes of the New Testament, in the apostolic church constitu-
tions’ canons, as well as in Jewish, Greek, Roman, and Patristic writings.25
The early rules governing these marriage contracts, as well as related con-
21. See analyses and primary texts on the theological, ethical, and legal teachings on mar-
riage in these three traditions and others in SEX, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN THE WORLD RELI-
GIONS (Don S. Browning, M. Christian Green & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2006).
22. Deuteronomy 24:1–4.
23. See David Novak, Jewish Marriage: Nature, Covenant, and Contract, in COVENANT
MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 26; Michael J. Broyde, The Covenant-Contract Dialectic in Jewish
Marriage and Divorce Law, in id., at 53; ZE’EV W. FALK, JEWISH MATRIMONIAL LAW IN THE
MIDDLE AGES (1966).
24. See examples and analysis in TO HAVE AND TO HOLD: MARRYING AND ITS DOCUMENTA-
TION IN WESTERN CHRISTENDOM (Philip L. Reynolds and John Witte, Jr. eds., 2007); PHILIP LYN-
DON REYNOLDS, MARRIAGE IN THE WESTERN CHURCH: THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF MARRIAGE
DURING THE PATRISTIC AND EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIODS (J. Den Boeft et al. eds., 1994).
25. See Colossians 3:18–4:1; Ephesians 5:21–6:9; 1 Peter 2:11–3:12; 1 Timothy 2:8–15;
5:1–2; 6:1–2; Titus 2:1–10, 3:1. See sources and discussion in CAROLYN OSIEK & DAVID BALCH,
FAMILIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT WORLD (1997); DON S. BROWNING, ET AL., FROM CULTURE
WARS TO COMMON GROUND (2d ed. 2000); EARLY CHRISTIAN FAMILIES IN CONTEXT: AN INTER-
DISCIPLINARY DIALOGUE (David Balch & Carolyn Osiek eds., 2003).
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tracts respecting dowries and other marital property, were later systematized
and elaborated by Christian jurists and theologians—in the eighth and ninth
centuries by Eastern Orthodox, in the twelfth and thirteen centuries by
Catholics, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Protestants.
More than a millennium ago, Muslim jurists and theologians created
the kitab, a special form of contract (‘adq) that a devout Muslim was relig-
iously bound to uphold in imitation and implementation of the Prophet’s
example and teaching. The kitab ideally established a distinctive relation-
ship of “affection, tranquility, and mercy” between husband and wife.26 It
defined their respective rights, duties, and identities vis-a`-vis each other,
their parents and children, and the broader communities of which they were
part. The signing of the kitab was a solemn religious event involving a
cleric who instructed the couple on their marital rights and duties as set out
in the Qur’an. While the Qur’an and Hadith set out basic norms of marriage
life and liturgy, it was particularly the Shari’a, the religious laws developed
in the centuries after the Prophet, which crystallized much of this tradition
of marital contracts, with ample variation among the Islamic schools of
jurisprudence.27
While these marriage contracts differed markedly within and among
these three Abrahamic traditions, several broad features were common.
First, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions alike made provision for
two contracts—betrothals or future promises to marry and spousals or pre-
sent promises to marry—with a mandatory waiting period between them.
The point of this waiting period was to allow couples to weigh the depth
and durability of their mutual love. It was also to invite others to weigh in
on the maturity and compatibility of the couple, to offer them counsel and
commodities, and to prepare for the celebration of their union and their life
together thereafter.
Second, all three traditions insisted that marriage depended in its es-
sence on the mutual consent of the man and the woman. Even if the man
and woman were represented by parents or guardians during the contract
negotiation, their own consent was essential to the validity of their mar-
26. Azizah al-Hibri, The Nature of the Islamic Marriage: Sacramental, Covenantal, or Con-
tractual?, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 182, 198–99.
27. See id.; ISLAMIC FAMILY IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK (Abdul-
lahi A. An-Na’im, ed., 2002); An exception to the usual rules of Islamic jurisprudence was the
muta’a, a temporary marriage contract traditionally recognized by some Shi’ite Muslims and now
becoming newly popular among the majority Shi’ite populations in Iraq. The muta’a was tradi-
tionally reserved to circumstances when a man was involved in protracted absences from home or
on dangerous pilgrimages and became a way not only of channeling his incontinence but also
devising some of his property to his temporary wife. Today, the muta’a is also becoming a conve-
nient form of effectively legalizing prostitution and concubinage, with muta’a contracts as short as
an hour being upheld by Shi’ite clerics. See SHAHLA HAERI, LAW OF DESIRE: TEMPORARY MAR-
RIAGE IN SHI’I IRAN (1989); ABU AL QASIM GURJI, TEMPORARY MARRIAGE (MUT’AH) IN ISLAMIC
LAW (Sachicho Murata trans., 1986); Rick Jervis, ‘Pleasure Marriages’ Regain Popularity in
Iraq, USA TODAY, May 12, 2005, at 4A.
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riage. Jewish and Muslim jurists came to this insight early in the develop-
ment of their law of marriage contracts. The Catholic tradition reached this
insight canonically only in the twelfth century, after which it was absorbed
in Orthodox and later in Protestant teachings. All three traditions continued
to tolerate the practice of arranged marriages and child marriages, particu-
larly when those were politically or commercially advantageous, but the
theory was that both the young man and the young woman reserved the
right to dissent from the arrangement upon reaching the age of consent.
Third, while all three traditions taught that every person of the age of
consent was free to choose a marital partner, persons were not free to
choose just anyone. God and nature set a first limit to the freedom of mari-
tal contract. Parties could not marry those who were related to them by
blood or by marriage—by bonds of consanguinity and affinity, as these
relations were called in Scripture. Custom and culture set a second limit.
The parties had to be of suitable piety and modesty, of comparable social
and economic status, and ideally (and, in some communities, indispensably)
of the same faith. The general law of contracts set a third limit. Both parties
had to have the capacity and freedom to enter contracts, and had to follow
proper contractual forms and ceremonies. Parents and guardians set a fourth
limit. A valid marriage at least for minors required the consent of both sets
of parents or guardians—and sometimes as well the consent of political
and/or spiritual authorities who stood in loco parentis.
Fourth, all three traditions often accompanied marriage promises with
elaborate exchanges of property, which sometimes gave rise to their own
marital property contracts. The prospective husband gave to his fiance´e
(and, sometimes her father or family as well) a betrothal gift, sometimes a
very elaborate and expensive gift. In some cultures, husbands followed this
by giving a wedding gift to the wife. The wife, in turn, brought into the
marriage her dowry, which was at minimum her basic living articles, some-
times a great deal more. These property exchanges were not an absolute
condition to the validity of a marriage, but breach of a contract to deliver
property in consideration of marriage could often result in dissolution at
least of the engagement contract.
Fifth, all three traditions eventually developed a marriage liturgy. In
the Jewish tradition, the Talmud provided detailed liturgies and prayers for
both the betrothal and the marriage, building in part on prototypes in the
book of Tobit. In the Jewish tradition, weddings were essential community
events, presided over by the Rabbi, and involving the entire local commu-
nity.28 The Christian tradition celebrated wedding liturgies of some sort
from the start, but the earliest surviving marriage liturgies are from the
28. KENNETH STEVENSON, NUPTIAL BLESSING: A STUDY OF CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE RITES 3–8
(1982).
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eighth century.29 Particularly among the Eastern Orthodox, these liturgies
became extraordinary visual and verbal symphonies of prayers, blessings,
oaths, and rituals, including the Eucharist. These liturgies grew more slowly
in the Christian West, not becoming mandatory among Catholics until
1563, and subject to wide and perennial variation and disputation among
Protestants. The Islamic tradition mandated an engagement ceremony,
which was a private, religious occasion involving the couple, their families,
a cleric, and two or more witnesses. It began with readings from the Qur’an
and marital instruction followed by final negotiation of the terms of the
marriage contract, and execution and attestation by the parties. The wed-
ding was a separate and joyous celebration, entirely secular in nature and
significance, and optional.30
Finally, all three traditions gave husband and wife standing before
their religious tribunals to press for the vindication of their marital rights.
The right to support, protection, sexual intercourse, and care for the
couple’s children were the most commonly litigated claims in all three tra-
ditions. But any number of other conjugal rights stipulated in the marriage
contract or guaranteed by general religious law could be litigated. Included
in all three traditions was the right of the parties to seek dissolution of the
marriage on discovery of an absolute impediment to its validity (such as
incest) or on grounds of a fundamental breach of the marriage commitment
(such as adultery).
B. Marriage as More than Contract
The insistence on a marriage liturgy, with its solemn rituals, prayers,
blessings, and oaths, is one important indication that, for Jews, Christians,
and Muslims, marriage was more than a simple bilateral contract. It was
also a fundamental public institution and religious practice. Other media
complemented the liturgies in reflecting these higher dimensions of mar-
riage—the beautiful artwork, ornate iconography, lofty religious language
of the marriage contracts themselves, elaborate rituals and etiquette of
courtship, consent, communal involvement in establishing the new marital
household, the impressive production of poems, household manuals, and
books of etiquette detailing the proper norms and habits of love, marriage,
and parentage of a faithful religious believer. All these media, and the am-
ple theological writings on them, helped to confirm and celebrate the deeper
origin, nature, and purpose of marriage in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
First, all three traditions recognized that marriage has its ultimate ori-
gin in the creation and commandments of God. The Jewish and Christian
traditions shared the teaching of Genesis that, already in Paradise, God had
29. Id. at 33–122. See also MARK SEARLE & KENNETH W. STEVENSON, DOCUMENTS OF THE
MARRIAGE LITURGY 3ff (1992).
30. See al-Hibri, supra note 26.
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brought the first man and the first woman together, and commanded them to
“be fruitful and multiply.”31 God had created them as social creatures, natu-
rally inclined and attracted to each other. God had given them the physical
capacity to join together and to beget children. God had commanded them
to love, help, and nurture each other and to inculcate in each other and in
their children the love of God, neighbor, and self. “Therefore a man leaves
his father and mother and cleaves to his wife, and the two become one
flesh,” Genesis 2:24 concludes. Both the Jewish tradition and the Christian
tradition eventually built on this primeval commandment, and its later bibli-
cal echoes, many of the basic norms of heterosexual monogamous marriage
and sexual ethics.32
The Muslim tradition rooted marriage not only in the teachings of the
Qur’an but also in the example of Mohammed. The Qur’an speaks of mar-
riage as a “solemn covenant” (mithaquan),33 indeed a form of worship
(‘ibadat) and religious observance enjoined upon each Muslim as a way of
keeping faith with the tradition of Islam. In the Hadith, the Prophet pro-
vided that “marriage is my Sunnah, so the one who turns away from my
Sunnah, turns away from me.”34 Also in the Hadith, the Prophet set out in
great detail the principles of proper marriage for a Muslim that were elabo-
rated in later books of Islamic law and etiquette.35 A number of these teach-
ings emulated, if not echoed, Jewish and Christian rules—the requirement
of monogamy notably excepted.
Second, all three traditions recognized that marriage is by nature a
multidimensional institution, whose formation, maintenance, and dissolu-
tion involves a variety of parties besides the couple themselves. Yes, mar-
riage is a contract, formed by the mutual consent of the marital couple and
subject to their wills and preferences. But in all three traditions, marriage is
also a spiritual association, subject to the creed, code, cult, and canons of
the religious community. Marriage is a social estate, subject to special laws
of property and association, and to the expectations and exactions of the
local community. Marriage is an economic institution, involving the crea-
tion and merger of properties, and triggering obligations of mutual care,
nurture, and sacrifice between husband and wife, and parent and child. And
marriage is a ritual institution, formed through liturgical prayers, oaths, and
blessings, and functioning thereafter as a vital site of religious instruction,
piety, and worship alongside the synagogue, church, or mosque.
31. Genesis 1:28.
32. See illustrative texts from all three traditions in EVE & ADAM: JEWISH, CHRISTIAN, AND
MUSLIM READINGS ON GENESIS AND GENDER (Kristen E. Kvam, Linda S. Schearing & Valarie H.
Ziegler, eds., 1999).
33. Qur’an 4:20.
34. al-Hibri, supra note 26, at 199.
35. For a detailed study, see Richard C. Martin, Marriage, Love, and Sexuality in Islam: An
Overview of Genres and Themes, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 217.
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Third, all three traditions recognized that marriage has inherent goods
that lie beyond the preferences of the couple, or the terms of their marriage
contract. Fundamental to all three traditions is the ideal of marriage as the
divinely-sanctioned means of perpetuating the faith—not only by the
couple maintaining their own household rites as vital sites of confessional
identity, but also by the couple’s procreation and teaching of children who
will form the next Schul, the next Church, or the next Umma. Hence, the
emphasis in all three traditions of avoiding marriages with a non-believer.
The emphasis on the procreation and nurture of children in the faith
and the corresponding prohibition on interreligious marriage were particu-
larly prominent themes in biblical and diaspora Judaism. These rules were
not only fundamental safeguards against assimilation into (an often hostile)
gentile culture, but they were also essential conditions for the Jewish com-
munity to continue to flourish and grow despite its aversion to prosely-
tism.36 These same emphases on procreation and against intermarriage also
emerged among some later Christian and Islamic communities, particularly
when they were placed in minority contexts, for example, Catholics in nine-
teenth-century America, and Muslims and Orthodox in twentieth-century
America.
The Christian tradition devised the most elaborate lists of the inherent
goods and goals of marriage, beyond the good of producing the next gener-
ation of the faithful. Among the most famous formulations was St. Augus-
tine’s fifth-century discourse on the marital goods of fides, proles, et
sacramentum.37 Marriage, said Augustine, is an institution of fides—faith,
trust, and love between husband and wife, and between parent and child
that goes beyond the faith demanded of any other temporal relationship.38
Marriage is a source of proles—children who carry on the family name and
tradition, perpetuate the human species, and fill God’s Church with the next
generation of saints.39 And marriage is a form of sacramentum—a symbolic
expression of Christ’s love for his Church, even a channel of God’s grace to
sanctify the couple, their children, and the broader community.40 This tril-
ogy of marital goods became axiomatic in later medieval Catholic theology,
and remains at the core of Catholic marriage teaching to this day.
An overlapping formulation, drawn from Roman law and Patristic lore,
was captured by the early seventh-century encyclopedist, St. Isidore of Se-
ville. Marriage, Isidore argued, provides husbands and wives with: (1) mu-
36. See David Novak, Jewish Marriage: Nature, Covenant, and Contract, in COVENANT
MARRIAGE, supra note 16; Michael J. Broyde, The Covenant-Contract Dialectic in Jewish Mar-
riage and Divorce Law, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16; see also chapters by Novak,
Broyde, and Jocelyn Hellig in SHARING THE BOOK: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS AND
WRONGS OF PROSELYTISM,17–78 (John Witte, Jr. & Richard C. Martin, eds., 1999).
37. See WITTE, JR., GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 361.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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tual love and support; (2) the mutual procreation and nurture of children;
and (3) the mutual protection from sexual sin and temptation.41 This
formula of marital goods confirmed the divine origins of marriage without
ascribing to it sacramental status. It also placed greater emphasis on the
virtues of marital love and the need for protection from sexual sin alongside
procreation. Isidore’s triology of marital goods eventually became a popular
formulation of marital goods among both Orthodox and Protestant Chris-
tians, and has strong analogues if not echoes in contemporaneous Islamic
tracts on marriage.42
The Christian tradition, building on Graeco-Roman sources, also em-
phasized the broader social goods of marriage—teaching that marriage is
good not only for the couple and their children, but also for the broader
civic communities of which they are a part. Ancient Greek philosophers and
Roman Stoics called marriage “the foundation of the republic,” and “the
private font of public virtue.”43 The Church Fathers called marital and fa-
milial love “the seedbed of the city,” and “the force that welds society to-
gether.”44 Catholics called the family “a domestic church,” and “a kind of
school of deeper humanity.”45 Protestants called the household a “little
church,” a “little state,” a “little seminary,” a “little commonwealth,” and
“the first school” of justice and love, authority and liberty, and rule and
citizenship.46 At the core of all these metaphors was a perennial Western
ideal that stable marriages and families are essential to the survival, flour-
ishing, and happiness of the greater commonwealths of church, state, and
civil society—and that a breakdown of marriage and the family will eventu-
ally have devastating consequences on these larger social institutions.
III. MARRIAGE AS COVENANT
The idea of covenant is emerging in Western law, theology, and ethics
today as a common trope to capture some of these higher dimensions of
marriage.47 It is also emerging as a common term to connect the interre-
ligious dialogue among Jews, Christians, and Muslims and the interdiscipli-
nary dialogue among jurists, theologians, and ethicists about marriage. The
41. See THE ETYMOLOGIES OF ISIDORE OF SEVILLE (Stephen A. Barney et al. trans., 2006).
42. Among the most famous formulations was that developed by the great eleventh-century
medieval jurist and theologian, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058–1111), who listed as marital goods:
(1) procreation; (2) proper satisfaction of natural sexual desires; (3) love and companionship; (4)
efficient ordering of the household; and (5) disciplining oneself. See Richard C. Martin, Mar-
riage, Love, and Sexuality in Islam: An Overview of Genres and Themes, in COVENANT MAR-
RIAGE, supra note 16, at 231–32.
43. WITTE, JR., GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 363.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., WILLIAM JOHNSON EVERETT, RELIGION, FEDERALISM, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
PUBLIC LIFE (1997); MAX L. STACKHOUSE, COVENANT AND COMMITMENTS: FAITH, FAMILY, AND
ECONOMIC LIFE (Don S. Browning & Ian S. Evison eds., 1997).
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connections between these layers of dialogue about marriage and covenant
are still developing. It is no coincidence, however, that the covenant mar-
riage movement in American law has been orchestrated, in ample part, by
proponents of a covenantal theology and ethics of marriage.
“Covenant” is a common Scriptural term for Jews, Christians, and
Muslims alike. It appears two hundred eighty-six times in the Hebrew Bible
(as berit), twenty-four times in the New Testament (as foedus), and twenty-
six times in the Qur’an (as mithaquan). “Covenant” has multiple meanings
and purposes in these three sacred scriptures. But it is used most impor-
tantly and most frequently to describe the special relationship between
Yahweh and Israel, God and His elect, and Allah and His chosen ones.
In each of these three scriptures, “covenant” is also occasionally used
to describe marriage. The Hebrew Bible analogizes Yahweh’s special cove-
nantal relationship with Israel to the special relationship between husband
and wife. Israel’s disobedience to Yahweh, in turn, particularly its procliv-
ity to worship false gods, is frequently described as a form of “playing the
harlot.” Idolatry, like adultery, can lead to divorce, and Yahweh threatens
this many times, even while calling his chosen to reconciliation. This image
comes through repeatedly in the writings of the Prophets: Hosea (2:2–23),
Isaiah (1:21–22; 54:5–8; 57:3–10; 61:10–11; 62:4–5), Jeremiah (2:2–3;
3:1–5, 6–25; 13:27; 23:10; 31:32), and Ezekiel (16:1–63; 23:1–49).48
The Hebrew Bible also speaks about marriage as a covenant in its own
right.49 The Prophet Malachi’s formulation is the fullest:
You cover the Lord’s altar with tears, with weeping and groaning
because he no longer regards the offering and accepts it with
favor at your hand. You ask, “Why does he not?” Because the
Lord was witness to the covenant between you and the wife of
your youth, to whom you have been faithless, though she is your
companion and your wife by covenant. Has not the one God made
and sustained for us the spirit of life? And what does he desire?
Godly offspring. So take heed to yourselves, and let none be
faithless to the wife of his youth. “For I hate divorce,” says the
Lord the God of Israel, “and covering one’s garments with vio-
lence,” says the Lord, the God of hosts. “So take heed to your-
selves and do not be faithless.”50
The Qur’an has comparable verses about marriage as a “solemn cove-
nant” (mithaquan ghalithan) which cannot be easily broken:
But if you decide to take one wife in place of another, even if you
have given the latter a quintal for dowry, take not the least
48. For a detailed study, see GORDON P. HUGENBERGER, MARRIAGE AS A COVENANT: A
STUDY OF BIBLICAL LAW AND ETHICS GOVERNING MARRIAGE DEVELOPED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OF MALACHI (1994).
49. Proverbs 2:17; Malachi 2:14–16.
50. Malachi 2:13–16.
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amount of it back; would you take it by slander and a manifest
wrong? And how could you take it when you have gone into one
another, and they have taken from you a solemn covenant?51
Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike have long used these kinds of
scriptural verses to speak of marriage, inter alia, as a covenant and to en-
courage the procreation of children and to discourage the practice of easy
divorce. This comes through in many theological, pastoral, and liturgical
texts already in the first millennium of the common era.52 What has not
been common in these three traditions until more recently is to link explic-
itly the divine covenant between God and humanity and the marital cove-
nant of husband and wife—in effect to make God a third party to the
marriage covenant, and in turn to make marriage a forum for the expression
of the divine-human covenant. What has also not been common until re-
cently is to develop a theology and jurisprudence of covenant marriage, a
way of describing the higher dimensions of marriage in concrete covenantal
terms, and linking those terms to the concrete contractual terms of marriage
that all three traditions have long had in place.
In the Jewish and Muslim traditions, the development of a covenant
model of marriage is very recent, indeed. David Novak and David Hartman
are pioneering the creation of a new covenantal theology, ethic, and law of
marriage within Judaism.53  Azizah al-Hibri is doing the same in the Islamic
tradition.54 What makes their respective efforts so promising is their insis-
tence on grounding their covenantal models of marriage in long-neglected
texts of the Hebrew Bible and Talmud and of the Qur’an and Hadith respec-
tively, and rereading and rethinking their own traditions in light of these
original canonical texts.
Covenant marriage has a longer pedigree in the Christian tradition. The
emerging scholarly consensus is that John Calvin (1509–1564), the six-
teenth-century Protestant reformer of Geneva, was the first to develop a
detailed covenant model of marriage in place of the prevailing Catholic
51. Qu’ran 4:20–21.
52. See, e.g., David Novak, Jewish Marriage: Nature, Covenant, and Contract, in COVENANT
MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 26; Max L. Stackhouse, Covenantal Marriage: Protestant Views and
Contemporary Life, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 153; Michael G. Lawler, Mar-
riage as Covenant in the Catholic Tradition, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 70;
Stanley Samuel Harakas, Covenant Marriage: Reflections from an Eastern Orthodox Perspective,
in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 92; James Turner Johnson, Marriage As Covenant in
Early Protestant Thought: Its Development and Implications, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra
note 16, at 124. See also STACKHOUSE, supra note 47; DANIEL J. ELAZAR, COVENANT & COMMON-
WEALTH: FROM CHRISTIAN SEPARATION THROUGH THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION (1996);
DANIEL J. ELAZAR, COVENANT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL MATRIX OF MODERN
DEMOCRACY (1998).
53. See al-Hibri, The Nature of the Islamic Marriage: Sacramental, Covenantal, or Contrac-
tual?, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 182.
54. See id.; see also Azizah al-Hibri & Raja’ M. El Habti, Islam, in SEX, MARRIAGE, AND
FAMILY IN WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 21, at 150.
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sacramental theology and canon law of marriage.55 Much of Calvin’s gen-
eral covenant theology was not new. Calvin expounded the traditional bibli-
cal idea of a divine covenant or agreement between God and humanity. He
followed conventional Christian teachings in distinguishing two interlock-
ing biblical covenants: (1) the covenant of works whereby the chosen peo-
ple of Israel, through obedience to God’s law, are promised eternal
salvation and blessing; and (2) the covenant of grace whereby the elect,
through faith in Christ’s incarnation and atonement, are promised eternal
salvation and beatitude. The covenant of works was created in Abraham,
confirmed in Moses, and consummated with the promulgation and accept-
ance of the Torah. The covenant of grace was created in Christ, confirmed
in the Gospel, and consummated with the confession and conversion of the
Christian.56
These traditional teachings on the covenant were common among
Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants, many of them rooted in the earlier
teachings of the Church Fathers.
Calvin went beyond the tradition, however, in using the doctrine of
covenant to describe not only the vertical relationships between God and
humanity, but also the horizontal relationships between husband and wife.
Just as God draws the elect believer into a covenant relationship with him,
Calvin argued, so God draws husband and wife into a covenant relationship
with each other. Just as God expects constant faith and good works in our
relationship with Him, he also expects connubial faithfulness and sacrificial
works in our relationship with our spouses.57 As Calvin put it:
God is the founder of marriage. When a marriage takes place be-
tween a man and a woman, God presides and requires a mutual
pledge from both. Hence Solomon in Proverbs 2:17 calls mar-
riage the covenant of God, for it is superior to all human con-
tracts. So also Malachi [2:14–16] declares that God is, as it were,
the guarantor [of marriage] who by his authority joins the man to
the woman, and sanctions the alliance.58
55. See sources and discussion in Michael G. Lawler, Marriage As Covenant in the Catholic
Tradition, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 70; Richard C. Martin, Marriage, Love, and
Sexuality in Islam: An Overview of Genres and Themes, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16,
at 217; Max L. Stackhouse, Covenantal Marriage: Protestant Views and Contemporary Life, in
COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 153. See elaboration of this thesis in JOHN WITTE, JR.,
Marriage as Covenant in the Calvinist Tradition, FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT, supra note 7,
at 74 and in JOHN WITTE, JR. & ROBERT M. KINGDON, SEX, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN JOHN
CALVIN’S GENEVA I: COURTSHIP, ENGAGEMENT, AND MARRIAGE (2006).
56. WITTE, JR. & KINGDON, supra note 55, at 482–83.
57. See the following writings of Calvin: Comm. Isaiah 1:21–22; 54:5–8; 57:3–10;
61:10–11; 62:4–5 (1551); Serm. Deuteronomy 5:18, 22:22 (1555); Comm. Harm. Gospel Luke
1:34–8 (1555); Comm. Psalms 16:4, 45:8–12, 82:1 (1557); Lect. Hosea 1:1–4, 2:19–20, 3:1–2,
4:13–14, 7:3, 9–10 (1557); Lect. Zechariah 2:11, 8:1–2 (ca. 1560); Lect. Malachi  2:13–16 (ca.
1560); Lect. Jeremiah 2:2–3, 25; 3:1–5, 6–25; 13:27; 23:10; 31:32, 51:4 (1563); Comm. Harm.
Law Deuteronomy 11:26–32 (1563); and Lect. Ezekiel 6:9, 16:1–63 (1564).
58. Calvin, Comm. Malachi 2:14.
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Calvin believed that God participates in the formation of the covenant
of marriage through his chosen agents on earth. The couple’s parents, as
God’s “lieutenants” for children, instruct the young couple in the mores and
morals of Christian marriage and give their consent to the union. Two wit-
nesses, as “God’s priests to their peers,” testify to the sincerity and solem-
nity of the couple’s promises and attest to the marriage event. The minister,
holding “God’s spiritual power of the Word,” blesses the union and admon-
ishes the couple and the community of their respective biblical duties and
rights. The magistrate, holding “God’s temporal power of the sword,” regis-
ters the parties, ensures the legality of their union, and protects them in their
conjoined persons and properties. This involvement of parents, peers, min-
isters, and magistrates in the formation of marriage was not an idle or dis-
pensable ceremony. These four parties represented different dimensions of
God’s involvement in the marriage covenant, and they were thus essential
to the legitimacy of the marriage itself. To omit any such party in the for-
mation of the marriage was, in effect, to omit God from the marriage cove-
nant. On this foundation, Calvin worked out in great detail a covenantal
theology of the origin, nature, and purpose of marriage and a covenantal
law of marital formation, maintenance, and dissolution, spousal rights,
roles, responsibilities, child care, custody, control, and much more. This
was the first comprehensive covenantal model of marriage in the Christian
tradition, and it informed the policies of the Genevan church and state alike.
Calvin may have developed the first covenantal model of marriage, but
by no means the last. An analogous covenantal model of marriage emerged
from the hand of contemporary Zurich reformer, Heinrich Bullinger
(1504–1575), whose work was tremendously influential both on the Conti-
nent and in England. By the later sixteenth century, the writings of Calvin
and Bullinger, separately and together, catalyzed a veritable industry of
Protestant covenant theology, jurisprudence, and ethics. These writings on
covenant, which crested in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England
and New England, provided a detailed integrated understanding not only of
marriage per se, but also of the place of marriage in church, state, and
broader society.59 In the last two centuries, covenantal language has also
become prominent in Protestant marriage and wedding liturgies. Indeed, to-
day, Protestant liturgies more than Protestant theologies are strongholds for
covenant marriage lore.
In the Catholic tradition, the Council of Trent closed the door firmly
on covenant marriage language in 1563. In its decree Tametsi, the Council
declared canonical the pervasive medieval teaching that marriage is a sacra-
ment. Heretical Protestant teachings on marriage, including the emerging
59. See John Witte, Jr., An Apt and Cheerful Conversation on Marriage, in GOD’S JOUST,
GOD’S JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 295–321; DAVID A. WEIR, EARLY NEW ENGLAND: A COVE-
NANTED SOCIETY (2005).
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teaching on covenant marriage in Reformed circles, could henceforth have
no place in the Catholic tradition.60 Four centuries later, however, the Sec-
ond Vatican Council reopened this door, using the language of covenant as
an organizing idiom to describe the origins, nature, and purpose of mar-
riage. In Gaudium et spes, one of the Council’s most influential documents,
the Vatican Fathers put in thus:
The intimate partnership of married life and love has been estab-
lished by the Creator and qualified by His laws. It is rooted in the
marriage covenant of irrevocable personal consent. . . . [A] man
and a woman, who by the marriage covenant of conjugal love
“are no longer two but one flesh” (Mt. 19:6), render mutual help
and service to each other through an intimate union of their per-
sons and of their actions. Through this union they experience the
meaning of their oneness and attain to it with growing perfection
day by day. As a mutual gift of two persons, this intimate union,
as well as the good of children, imposes total fidelity on the
spouses, and argues for an unbreakable oneness between them.
Christ the Lord abundantly blessed this many-faceted love, wel-
ling up as it does from the fountain of divine love and structured
as it is on the model of His union with the Church. For as God of
old made himself present to His people through a covenant of
love and fidelity, so now the Savior of men and the Spouse of the
Church comes into the lives of married Christians through the
sacrament of matrimony.61
Since Vatican II, a number of Catholic ethicists, jurists, theologians,
and catechists have come to adopt the language of covenant marriage,
alongside the traditional language of marriage as sacrament. A number of
these same Catholic scholars have used the language of covenant to engage
in rigorous ecumenical discussions of the higher dimensions of marriage
and to find common cause with Protestants, Jews, and others in pressing
reforms of state marriage law.
IV. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
The Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions have long taught that
marriage is a contract. Marriage is predicated on the mutual consent of man
and woman. It is recorded in written instruments. It is celebrated in formal
rituals. It triggers exchanges of property. It creates a new legal entity, the
60. See H.J. SCHROEDER, Doctrine of the Sacrament of Matrimony, Twenty-Fourth Session
(November 11, 1563), in CANONS AND DECREES OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT 180 (1941, 3d prtg.
1955); CATECHISM OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT FOR PARISH PRIESTS 338 (John A. McHugh &
Charles J. Callan trans., 14th prtg. TAN Books and Publishers 1982) (1976). See discussion of
occasional pre-Tridentine Catholic references to marriage as covenant in Michael G. Lawler, Mar-
riage as Covenant in the Catholic Tradition, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 70.
61. Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, para. 48, in THE DOCUMENT OF VATICAN II
(Walter M. Abbott & Joseph Gallagher eds., and trans., Guild Press, 1966).
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marital household, with a complex of new rights and duties between hus-
band and wife, parent and child, and couple and state. It grants husband and
wife alike the right to press lawsuits to vindicate their marital rights. Con-
tract is the backbone of marriage, and gives marriage its legal structure,
stature, and strength.
The Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions have also long taught,
however, that marriage is more than a mere contract. Marriage is also one
of the great mediators of individuality and community, revelation and rea-
son, and tradition and modernity. Marriage is at once a harbor of the self
and a harbinger of the community, a symbol of divine love and a structure
of reasoned consent, and an enduring ancient mystery and a constantly
modern invention. Marriage is rooted in primeval commands and prophetic
examples. It is reflected in religious, ceremonial, social, economic, political,
and cultural norms and forms. It is at once private and public, contractual
and spiritual, voluntary and natural, and psychological and civilizational in
origin, nature, and function.
The term “covenant” is emerging today as a convenient and cogent
means to capture these higher dimensions of marriage—though this is by no
means the only language available. “Covenant” is an ancient trope, with
deep roots in Jewish, Christian, and Muslim canonical texts, and with ample
and diverse expression in the legal traditions that emerged under the influ-
ence of these religious traditions. In contemporary American law, “cove-
nant” has the kind of neutrality and plasticity needed to signal that marriage
has higher dimensions, even while leaving the definition of these higher
dimensions to individual choice and community accent.
While, historically, the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions found
ways to reconcile the contractual and covenantal dimensions of marriage,
American law today juxtaposes them. In all but three states, parties who
wish to marry must choose the state’s contract marriage option. Contract
marriage has minimal rules of formation and dissolution, and hundreds of
built-in state and federal rights and duties for the couple and their children.
Couples may add rights and duties beyond those defined by the state’s con-
tract marriage law. These can be set out in prenuptial contracts negotiated
between the parties. Or they can be set out in the religious laws and customs
of the community of which these marital parties are voluntary members.
Even here, however, the contractual dimensions of marriage are preferred.
Some private prenuptial contracts will be enforced by state courts, but relig-
ious laws of marriage and divorce will not be enforced—even if the
couple’s prenuptial contract stipulates that religious law should govern their
contract in the event of dispute. New York’s get statute—which allows an
Orthodox Jewish couple to divorce only if their Rabbis first give them a
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Jewish divorce—is a rare and remarkable exception to the usual rules.62
State courts usually will not enforce religious laws of marriage and divorce,
particularly if those religious laws differ from state laws. Religious authori-
ties are thus largely powerless to enforce their religious rulings on marriage
against one of their members who sues in state court. They may apply spiri-
tual pressure and sanctions to get a party to comply with their internal relig-
ious norms—and even shun or excommunicate that party for defying their
authority.63 If the party persists in the civil suit, however, the state court
will enforce its own state marriage and divorce laws, not those of the relig-
ious community. Religious norms and forms of marriage and divorce are
subordinate to the state’s contract laws of marriage.
This is not altogether true in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona today.
In these three states, parties who wish to marry may choose either contract
marriage or covenant marriage. The contract marriage option in these three
states is largely the same as that available in any other state. The covenant
marriage option, however, is unique in that it tightens marital formation and
dissolution rules considerably. In particular, covenant marriage requires
parties to involve third party counselors, including the parties’ own relig-
ious authorities if they are licensed to be counselors. It also requires parties
to waive their rights to unilateral no-fault divorce and to accept rules of
marital dissolution that are closer to the grounds and procedures tradition-
ally recognized by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim authorities. Covenant
marriage laws thus go further than contract marriage laws in reflecting and
protecting some of the higher dimensions of marriage. Covenant marriage
statutes serve a particularly valuable teaching function—instructing the
community on the higher regard that the state has for marriage, instructing
the couple of the higher rigor that marriage has for them, and instructing
religious communities that marriage is more than a mere contract.
It is the state authorities, however, not the religious authorities, who
enforce covenant marriages in these three states. As with contract marriage,
so with covenant marriage, parties may supplement the rights and duties set
out by state law with voluntarily-chosen or religiously-mandated norms.
But the same limitations on the enforceability of these supplementary
norms by religious authorities will apply in these three covenant marriage
states as prevail in contract marriage states. State formulations of what mar-
riage entails in the individual case will still trump countervailing religious
formulations—even if the state is interpreting the meaning of a “covenant”
marriage.
62. See MICHAEL J. BROYDE, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND THE ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH
LAW (2001).
63. See Michael J. Broyde, Forming Religious Communities and Respecting Dissenter’s
Rights: A Jewish Tradition for a Modern Society, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PER-
SPECTIVE 203 (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996).
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Moreover, outside of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona, the state will
not even recognize a covenant marriage, only a contract marriage. An es-
tranged spouse can thus escape a covenant marriage simply by moving to
and filing for divorce in any of the forty-seven American states or any num-
ber of foreign countries without covenant marriage options. Current conflict
of laws rules, both domestic and international, do not favor the enforcement
of covenant marriage laws over the contract marriage laws of the forum
state where the divorce case is litigated. And the trend in many non-cove-
nant states and many foreign nations in the past decade has been to weaken,
rather than strengthen, traditional forms and norms of marriage.64 These
unfavorable conflicts rules, though not yet strongly tested through litigation,
underscore the reality that covenant marriage laws are an important, but
only a partial, legal response to the fallout of the modern revolution of mar-
riage and divorce.
A fuller legal response requires additional strategies of reform and en-
gagement, particularly on the part of religious communities.65 The first step
is for America’s religious communities to get their legal and theological
houses on marriage and the family in order. Too many religious communi-
ties in America today, Christian churches notably among them, are losing
the capacity to engage the hard legal, political, and social issues of our day
with doctrinal rigor, moral clarity, and canonical authenticity. In centuries
past, the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions alike produced massive
codes of religious law and discipline that covered many areas of private and
public life, including domestic life. They instituted sophisticated tribunals
for the equitable enforcement of these laws. They produced exquisite works
of theology and jurisprudence that worked out the precepts of proper do-
mestic living in great detail. Some of that sophisticated legal work still goes
on among some religious communities today. Some religious jurists and
ethicists still take up some of these questions. But the legal structure and
sophistication of modern American religious communities as a whole is a
pale shadow of what went on before, and their marital norms and habits are
increasingly becoming simple variations on the cultural status quo.66
American religious communities must think more seriously about re-
storing and reforming their own bodies of religious law on marriage, di-
vorce, and sexuality, instead of simply acquiescing in state laws and
culture. American states, in turn, must think more seriously about granting
greater deference to the marital laws and customs of legitimate religious
64. See detailed analysis and sources in Peter Hay, The American “Covenant Marriage” in
the Conflict of Laws, in COVENANT MARRIAGE, supra note 16, at 294.
65. See various options outlined in Don S. Browning & David A. Clairmont, Introduction to
AMERICAN RELIGIONS AND THE FAMILY: HOW FAITH TRADITIONS COPE WITH MODERNIZATION
AND DEMOCRACY (Don S. Browning & David A. Clairmont eds., 2007).
66. See also John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage in the Western Tradition, in
GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE, supra note 19, at ch. 16.
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and cultural groups that cannot accept a marriage law of the common de-
nominator or denomination. Other sophisticated legal cultures—such as
England, India, and South Africa—grant semi-autonomy to Catholic,
Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, and other groups to conduct their subjects’ domes-
tic affairs in accordance with their own laws and customs, with the state
setting only minimum conditions and limits. It might well be time for
America likewise to translate its growing cultural pluralism into a more
concrete legal pluralism on marriage and family life.67
67. See id. at 322–63.
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